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The Institutional Structure of Production
R.H. Coase*
In my long life I have known some great economists but
I have never counted myself among their number nor
walked in their company. I have made no innovations
in high theory. My contribution to economics has been
to urge the inclusion in our analysis of features of the
economic system so obvious that, like the postman in
G. K. Chesterton's Father Brown tale, "The Invisible
Man," they have tended to be overlooked. Nonetheless, once included in the analysis, they will, as I
believe, bring about a complete change in the structure
of economic theory, at least in what is called price
theory or microeconomics. What Ihave done is to show
the importance for the working of the economic system
of what may be termed the institutional structure of
production. In this lecture I shall explain why, in my
view, these features of the economic system were ignored and why their recognition will lead to a change
in the way we analyze the working of the economic
system and in the way we think about economic policy,
changes which are already beginning to occur. I will
also speak about the empirical work that needs to be
done if this transformation in our approach is to increase our understanding. In speaking about this transformation, I do not wish to suggest that it is the result
of my work alone. Oliver Williamson, Harold Demsetz,
Steven Cheung, among others, have made outstanding
contributions to the subject and without their work and
that of many others, I doubt whether the significance of
my writings would have been recognized. While it has
been a great advantage of the creation of the Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel that, by
drawing attention to the significance of particular fields
of economics, it encourages further research in them,
the highlighting of the work of a few scholars, or, in my
case, one scholar, tends to obscure the importance of
the contributions of other able scholars whose researches
*Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics, the University of Chicago Law School, winner of the 1991 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences."The Institutional Structure of Production" is the Nobel Prize Lecture, delivered December 9, 1991, in
Stockholm, Sweden. Q 1991 The Nobel Foundation.

1

have been crucial to the development of the field.
I will be speaking of that part of economics which has
come to be called industrial organization but to understand its present state, it is necessary to say something
about the development of economics in general. During the two centuries since the publication of The
Wealth of Nations, the main activity of economists, it
seems to me, has been to fill the gaps in Adam Smith's
system, to correct his errors and to make his analysis
vastly more exact. A principal theme of The Wealth of
Nations was that government regulation or centralized
planning was not necessary to make an economic
system function in an orderly way. The economy could
be co-ordinated by a system of prices (the "invisible
hand") and, furthermore, with beneficial results. A
major task of economists since the publication of The
Wealth of Nations, as Harold Demsetz has explained,1
has been to formalize this proposition of Adam Smith.
The given factors are technology and the tastes of
consumers, and individuals, who follow their own interest, are governed in their choices by a system of
prices. Economists have uncovered the conditions necessary if Adam Smith's results are to be achieved and
where, in the real world, such conditions do not appear
to be found, they have proposed changes which are
designed to bring them about. It is what one finds in the
textbooks. Harold Demsetz has said rightly that what
this theory analyzes is a system of extreme decentralization. It has been a great intellectual achievement and
it throws light on many aspects of the economic system.
But it has not been by any means all gain. The concentration on the determination of prices has led to a
narrowing of focus which has had as a result the neglect
of other aspects of the economic system. Sometimes
indeed it seems as though economists conceive of their
subject as being concerned only with the pricing system
and that anything outside this is considered as no part
of their business. Thus, my old chief and wonderful
human being, Lionel Robbins, wrote, in The Nature and
Significance of Economic Science, about the "glaring
deficiencies" of the old treatment of the theory of production with its discussion of peasant proprietorships
and industrial forms: "It suggests that from the point of
1 Harold Demsetz, Ownership, Control and the Firm,Volume 1,
page 145.
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viewof the economist 'organization' isa matter of internal
industrial (or agricultural) arrangement-if not internal
to the firm, at any rate internal to 'the' industry. At the
same time it tends to leave out completely the governing
factor of all productive organization-the relationship of
prices and cost....."2 What this comes down to is that, in
Robbins's view, an economist does not interest himself
in the internal arrangements within organizations but
only in what happens on the market, the purchase of
factors of production and the sale of the goods that
these factors produce. What happens in between the
purchase of the factors of production and the sale of the
goods that are produced by these factors is largely
ignored. I do not know how far economists today share
Robbins's attitude but it is undeniable that
microeconomics is largely a study of the determination
of prices and output, indeed this part of economics is
often called price theory.
This neglect of other aspects of the system has been
made easier by another feature of modern economic
theory-the growing abstraction of the analysis, which
does not seem to call for a detailed knowledge of the
actual economic system or, at any rate, has managed to
proceed without it. Holmstrom and Tirole writing on
"The Theory of the Firm" in the recently published
Handbook of Industrial Organization, conclude at the
end of their article of sixty-three pages that "the evidence/theory ratio.. .is currently very low in this field."3
Peltzman has written a scathing review of the Handbook
in which he points out how much of the discussion in
it is theory without any empirical basis. 4 What is
studied is a system which lives in the minds of economists but not on earth. I have called the result "blackboard economics." The firm and the market appear by
name but they lack any substance. The firm in mainstream economic theory has often been described as a
."black box." And so it is.This is very extraordinary given
that most resources in a modern economic system are
employed within firms, with how these resources are
2

Lionel Robbins, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science
(1932), page 70.
3 Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig (editors), Handbook
of IndustrialOrganization, page 126.
4 Sam Peltzman, "The Handbook of Industrial Organization: A
Review Article", Journalof Political Economy, February, 1991, pages
201-217.
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used dependent on administrative decisions and not
directly on the operation of a market. Consequently the
efficiency of the economic system depends to a very
considerable extent on how these organisations conduct their affairs, particularly, of course, the modem
corporation. Even more surprising, given their interest
in the pricing system, is the neglect of the market or
more specifically the institutional arrangements which
govern the process of exchange. As these institutional
arrangements determine to a large extent what is produced, what we have is a very incomplete theory. All
this is beginning to change and in this process I am glad
to have played my part. The value of including such
institutional factors in the corpus of mainstream economics is made clear by recent events in Eastern Europe. These ex-communist countries are advised to
move to a market economy, and their leaders wish to do
so, but without the appropriate institutions no market
economy of any significance is possible. If we knew
more about our own economy, we would be in a better
position to advise them.
What I endeavored to do in the two articles cited by
the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences was to attempt
to fill these gaps or more exactly to indicate the direction in which we should move if they are ultimately to
be filled. Let me start with "The Nature of the Firm." I
went as a student to the London School of Economics
in 1929 to study for a Bachelor of Commerce degree,
specialising in the Industry group, supposedly designed
for people who wished to become works managers, a
choice of occupation for which I was singularly illsuited. However, in 1931 I had a great stroke of luck.
Arnold Plant was appointed Professor of Commerce in
1930. He was a wonderful teacher. I began to attend his
seminar in 1931, some five months before I took the
final examinations. It was a revelation. He quoted Sir
Arthur Salter: "The normal economic system works
itself." And he explained how a competitive economic
system co-ordinated by prices would lead to the production of goods and services which consumers valued
most highly. Before being exposed to Plant's teaching,
my notions on how the economy worked were extremely woolly. After Plant's seminar I had a coherent
view of the economic system. He introduced me to
Adam Smith's "invisible hand." As I had taken the first
year of University work while still at High School, I
4

managed to complete the requirements for a degree in
two years. However, University regulations required
three years of residence before adegree could be granted.
I had therefore a year to spare. I then had another stroke
of luck. Iwas awarded a Cassel travelling scholarship by
the University of London. I decided to spend the year
in the United States, this being treated as a year's
residence at the London School of Economics, the
regulations being somewhat loosely interpreted.
I decided to study vertical and lateral integration of
industry in the United States. Plant had described in his
lectures the different ways in which various industries
were organized but we seemed to lack any theory which
would explain these differences. I set out to find it.
There was also another puzzle which, in my mind,
needed to be solved and which seemed to be related to
my main project. The view of the pricing system as a coordinating mechanism was clearly right but there were
aspects of the argument which troubled me. Plant was
opposed to all schemes, then very fashionable during
the Great Depression, for the co-ordination of industrial production by some form of planning. Competition, according to Plant, acting through a system of
prices, would do all the co-ordination necessary. And
yet we had a factor of production, management, whose
function was to co-ordinate. Why was it needed if the
pricing system provided all the co-ordination necessary? The same problem presented itself to me at that
time in another guise. The Russian Revolution had
taken place only fourteen years earlier. We knew then
very little about how planning would actually be carried
out in a communist system. Lenin had said that the
economic system in Russia would be run as one big
factory. However, many economists in the West maintained that this was an impossibility. And yet there
were factories in the West and some of them were
extremely large. How did one reconcile the views
expressed by economists on the role of the pricing
system and the impossibility of successful central economic planning with the existence of management and
of these apparently planned societies, firms, operating
within our own economy? 5
5 A fuller account of these events will be found in Oliver E.
Williamson and Sidney G. Winter (editors), The Nature of the Firm,
Origins, Evolution and Development, pages 34-47.
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I found the answer by the Summer of 1932. It was to
realize that there were costs of using the pricing mechanism. What the prices are have to be discovered. There
are negotiations to be undertaken, contracts have to be

drawn up, inspections have to be made, arrangements
have to be made to settle disputes, and so on. These
costs have come to be known as transaction costs. Their
existence implies that methods of co-ordination alternative to the market, which are themselves costly and
in various ways imperfect, may nonetheless be preferable to relying on the pricing mechanism, the only
method of co-ordination normally analyzed by economists. It was the avoidance of the costs of carrying out
transactions through the market that could explain the
existence of the firm in which the allocation of factors
came about as a result of administrative decisions (and
I thought it did). In my 1937 article I argued that in a
competitive system there would be an optimum of
planning since a firm, that little planned society, could
only continue to exist if it performed its co-ordination
function at a lower cost than would be incurred if it were
achieved by means of market transactions and also at a
lower cost than this same function could be performed
by another firm. To have an efficient economic system
it is necessary not only to have markets but also areas of
planning within organizations of the appropriate size.
What this mix should be we find as a result of competition. This is what I said in my article of 1937. However, as we know from a letter I wrote in 1932 which has
been preserved, all the essentials of this argument had
been presented in a lecture I gave in Dundee at the
beginning of October, 1932.6 1 was then twenty-one
years of age and the sun never ceased to shine. I could
never have imagined that these ideas would become
some sixty years later a major justification for the award
of a Nobel Prize. And it is a strange experience to be
praised in my eighties for work I did in my twenties.
There is no doubt that the recognition by economists
of the importance of the role of the firm in the functioning of the economy will prompt them to investigate its
activities more closely. The work of Oliver Williamson
and others has led to a greater understanding of the
factors which govern what a firm does and how it does
it. And we can also hope to learn much more in future
6 ibid., pages 34-35.
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from the studies of the activities of firms which have
recently been initiated by the Center for Economic
Studies of the Bureau of the Census of the United
States. But it would be wrong to think that the most
important consequence for economics of the publication of "The Nature of the Firm" has been to direct
attention to the importance of the firm in our modem
economy, a result which, in my view, would have come
about in any case. What I think will be considered in
future to have been the important contribution of this
article is the explicit introduction of transaction costs
into economic analysis. I argued in "The Nature of the
Firm" that the existence of transaction costs leads to
the emergence of the firm. But the effects are pervasive
in the economy. Businessmen in deciding on their ways
of doing business and on what to produce have to take
into account transaction costs. If the costs of making an
exchange are greater than the gains which that exchange would bring, that exchange would not take
place and the greater production that would flow from
specialization would not be realized. In this way transaction costs affect not only contractual arrangements
but also what goods and services are produced. Not to
include transaction costs in the theory leaves many
aspects of the working of the economic system unexplained, including the emergence of the firm, but much
else besides. In fact, a large part of what we think of as
economic activity is designed to accomplish what high
transaction costs would otherwise prevent or to reduce
transaction costs so that individuals can freely negotiate and we can take advantage of that diffused knowledge of which Hayek has told us.
I know of only one part of economics in which
transaction costs have been used to explain a major
feature of the economic system and that relates to the
evolution and use of money. Adam Smith pointed out
the hindrances to commerce that would arise in an
economic system in which there was a division of labor
but in which all exchange had to take the form of barter.
No one would be able to buy anything unless he possessed
something that the producer wanted. This difficulty, he
explained, could be overcome by the use of money. A
person wishing to buy something in a barter system has
to find someone who has this product for sale but who
also wants some of the goods possessed by the potential
buyer. Similarly, a person wishing to sell something has
7

to find someone who both wants what he has to offer
and also possesses something that the potential seller
wants. Exchange in a barter system requires what Jevons
called "this double coincidence." Clearly the search for
partners in exchange with suitable qualifications is
likely to be very costly and will prevent many potentially beneficial exchanges from taking place. The
benefit brought about by the use of money consists of a
reduction in transaction costs. The use of money also
reduces transaction costs by facilitating the drawing up
of contracts as well as by reducing the quantity of goods
that need to be held for purposes of exchange. However, the nature of the benefits secured by the use of
money seems to have faded into the background so far
as economists are concerned and it does not seem to
have been noticed that there are other features of the
economic system which exist because of the need to
mitigate transaction costs.
I now turn to that other article cited by the Swedish
Academy, "The Problem of Social Cost," published
some thirty years ago. Iwill not say much here about its
influence on legal scholarship, which has been immense, but will mainly consider its influence on economics, which has not been immense, although I
believe that in time it will be. It is my view that the
approach used in that article will ultimately transform
the structure of microeconomics-and I will explain
why. I should add that in writing this article I had no
such general aim in mind. I thought that I was exposing
the weaknesses of Pigou's analysis of the divergence
between private and social products, an analysis generally accepted by economists, and that was all. It was
only later, and in part as a result of conversations with
Steven Cheung in the 1960s, that I came to see the
general significance for economic theory of what I had
written in that article and also to see more clearly what
questions needed to be further investigated.
Pigou's conclusion and that of most economists using
standard economic theory was (and perhaps still is) that
some kind of government action (usually the imposition of taxes) was required to restrain those whose
actions had harmful effects on others (often termed
negative externalities). What I showed in that article,
as I thought, was that in a regime of zero transaction
costs, an assumption of standard economic theory,
negotiations between the parties would lead to those
8

arrangements being made which would maximise
wealth and this irrespective of the initial assignment of
rights. This is the infamous Coase Theorem, named
and formulated by Stigler, although it is based on work
of mine. Stigler argues that the Coase Theorem follows
from the standard assumptions of economic theory. Its
logic cannot be questioned, only its domain.7 I do not
disagree with Stigler. However, I tend to regard the
Coase Theorem as a stepping stone on the way to an
analysis of an economy with positive transaction costs.
The significance to me of the Coase Theorem is that it
undermines the Pigovian system. Since standard economic theory assumes transaction costs to be zero, the
Coase Theorem demonstrates that the Pigovian solutions are unnecessary in these circumstances. Ofcourse,
it does not imply, when transaction costs are positive,
that government actions (such as government operation, regulation or taxation, including subsidies) could
not produce a better result than relying on negotiations
between individuals in the market. Whether this would
be so could be discovered not by studying imaginary
governments but what real governments actually do.
My conclusion: let us study the world of positive transaction costs.
If we move from a regime of zero transaction costs to
one of positive transaction costs, what becomes immediately clear is the crucial importance of the legal
system in this new world. I explained in "The Problem
of Social Cost" that what are traded on the market are
not, as is often supposed by economists, physical entities but the rights to perform certain actions, and the
rights which individuals possess are established by the
legal system. While we can imagine in the hypothetical
world of zero transaction costs that the parties to an
exchange would negotiate to change any provision of
the law which prevents them from taking whatever
steps are required to increase the value ofproduction, in
the real world of positive transaction costs, such a
procedure would be extremely costly, and would make
unprofitable, even where it was allowed, a great deal of
such contracting around the law. Because of this, the
rights which individuals possess, with their duties and
privileges, will be to a large extent what the law deterGeorge J.Stigler, "Two Notes on the Coase Theorem", Yale Law
Journal,December, 1989, pages 631-633.
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mines. As a result, the legal system will have a profound
effect on the working of the economic system and may
in certain respects be said to control it. It is obviously
desirable that these rights should be assigned to those
who can use them most productively and with incentives that lead them to do so and that to discover (and
maintain) such a distribution of rights, the costs of their
transference should be low, through clarity in the law
and by making the legal requirements for such transfers
less onerous. Since this can come about only if there is
an appropriate system of property rights (and they are
enforced), it is easy to understand why so many academic lawyers (at least in the United States) have
found so attractive the task of uncovering the character
of such a property rights system and why the subject of
"law and economics" has flourished in American law
schools. Indeed, work is going forward at such a pace
that I do not consider it overoptimistic to believe that
the main outlines of the subject will be drawn within
five or ten years.
Until quite recently most economists seem to have
been unaware of this relationship between the economic and legal systems except in the most general way.
Stock and produce exchanges are often used by economists as examples of perfect or near-perfect competition. But these exchanges regulate in great detail the
activities of traders (and this quite apart from any
public regulation there may be). What can be traded,
when it can be traded, the terms of settlement and so on
are all laid down by the authorities of the exchange.
There is, in effect, a private law. Without such rules and
regulations, the speedy conclusion of trades would not
be possible. Of course, when trading takes place outside
exchanges (and this is almost all trading) and where the
dealers are scattered in space and have very divergent
interests, as in retailing and wholesaling, such a private
law would be difficult to establish and their activities
will be regulated by the laws of the State. It makes little
sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange
without specifying the institutional setting within which
the trading takes place since this affects the incentives
to produce and the costs of transacting. I think this is
now beginning to be recognized and has been made
crystal clear by what is going on in Eastern Europe
today. The time has surely gone in which economists
could analyze in great detail two individuals exchang10

ing nuts for berries on the edge of the forest and then
feel that their analysis of the process of exchange was
complete, illuminating though this analysis may be in
certain respects. The process of contracting needs to be
studied in a real world setting. We would then learn of
the problems that are encountered and of how they are
overcome and we would certainly become aware of the
richness of the institutional alternatives among which
we have to choose.
Oliver Williamson has ascribed the non-use or limited use of my thesis in "The Nature of the Firm" to the
fact that it has not been made "operational," by which
he means that the concept of transaction costs has not
been incorporated into a general theory. I think this is
correct. There have been two reasons for this. First,
incorporating transaction costs into standard economic
theory which has been based on the assumption that
they are zero, would be very difficult and economists
who, like most scientists, as Thomas Kuhn has told us,
are extremely conservative in their methods, have not
been inclined to attempt it. Second, Williamson has
also pointed out that although I was correct in making
the choice between organization within the firm or
through the market the center piece of my analysis, Idid
not indicate what the factors were that determined the
outcome of this choice and thus made it difficult for
others to build on what is often described as a "fundamental insight." This also is true. But the interrelationships which govern the mix of market and hierarchy, to
use Williamson's terms, are extremely complex and in
our present state of ignorance it will not be easy to
discover what these factors are. What we need is more
empirical work. In a paper written for a conference of
the National Bureau of Economic Research Iexplained
why I thought this was so. This is what I said: "An
inspired theoretician might do as well without such
empirical work, but my own feeling is that the inspiration is most likely to come through the stimulus provided by the patterns, puzzles, and anomalies revealed
by the systematic gathering of data, particularly when
the prime need is to break our existing habits of
thought."8 This statement was made in 1970. I still
think that in essentials it is true today. Although much
interesting and important research was done in the
8 R.H. Coase, The Firn, the Market and the Law, page 71.
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seventies and eighties and we certainly know much
more than we did in 1970, there is little doubt that a
great deal more empirical work is needed. However, I
have come to the conclusion that the main obstacle
faced by researchers in industrial organization is the
lack of available data on contracts and the activities of
firms. I have therefore decided to do something about
it.

Believing that there is a great deal of data on contracts and the activities of firms in the United States
available in government departments and agencies in
Washington, D. C., and that this information is largely
unknown to economists, I organized a conference at the
University of Chicago Law School in the Summer of
1990 at which government officials presented papers in
which they described what data was available and how
to get access to it and also reported on some of the
research being carried out within their departments.
The audience consisted of academic economists. It was,
as a colleague remarked, a case of supply meeting
demand. The proceedings of this conference will be
published in a special issue of the Journal of Law and
Economics. Another development with which I am
associated is the establishment of the Center for the
Study of Contracts and the Structure of Enterprise at
the Business School of the University of Pittsburgh.
This Center will make large-scale collections of business contracts and will prepare databases which will be
made available to all researchers, whatever their institution. Nor should we forget the work now getting
started at the Center for Economic Studies of the
Bureau of the Census. This greater availability of data
and the encouragement given to all researchers working on the institutional structure of production by the
award to me of the Nobel Prize should result in a
reduction in that elegant but sterile theorizing so commonly found in the economics literature on industrial
organization and should lead to studies which increase
our understanding of how the real economic system
works.
My remarks have sometimes been interpreted as
implying that I am hostile to the mathematization of
economic theory. This is untrue. Indeed, once we begin
to uncover the real factors affecting the performance of
the economic system, the complicated interrelations
between them will clearly necessitate a mathematical
12

treatment, as in the natural sciences, and economists
like myself, who write in prose, will take their bow. May
this period soon come.
I am very much aware that many economists whom I
respect and admire will not agree with the opinions Ihave
expressed and some may even be offended by them. But a
scholar must be content with the knowledge that what is
false in what he says will soon be exposed and, as for what
is true, he can count on ultimately seeing it accepted, if
only he lives long enough.
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